fn fees(env: soroban_sdk::Env) -> i128fn init(
env: soroban_sdk::Env,
admin: soroban_sdk::Address,
verifier: soroban_sdk::Address,
collateral: soroban_sdk::Address,
reserve_col: i128,
reserve_yes: i128,
reserve_no: i128,
)fn ping(env: soroban_sdk::Env) -> u32fn reseed(
env: soroban_sdk::Env,
reserve_col: i128,
reserve_yes: i128,
reserve_no: i128,
)payloads carries exactly one encrypted note payload, for the single
commitment this call inserts.
fn shield(
env: soroban_sdk::Env,
from: soroban_sdk::Address,
proof: VProof,
public_inputs: soroban_sdk::Vec>,
screening_ref: soroban_sdk::BytesN<32>,
payloads: soroban_sdk::Vec,
) fn resolve(env: soroban_sdk::Env, final_price: i128)fn add_deny(env: soroban_sdk::Env, screening_ref: soroban_sdk::BytesN<32>)Withdraw (unshield) collateral to recipient by spending two input notes.
The circuit binds a recipient field element; this transfers to the recipient
Address arg only after cryptographically enforcing that it equals
encode_recipient(&env, &recipient) from the proof's recipient_field (checked
above, before verify_proof). Without this a malicious relayer β which is
mandatory on this path β could redirect withdrawals to an address of its choosing.
See circuits/CARRY_FORWARD.md (Plan 3, item 3) for the original gap writeup.
payloads carries exactly one encrypted note payload, for the change
commitment. The withdrawn value leaves the pool transparently and has no
note to recover.
fn unshield(
env: soroban_sdk::Env,
relayer: soroban_sdk::Address,
proof: VProof,
public_inputs: soroban_sdk::Vec>,
recipient: soroban_sdk::Address,
screening_ref: soroban_sdk::BytesN<32>,
payloads: soroban_sdk::Vec,
) Private BUY: spend COL notes β mint a 1:1 complete set β swap the minted opposite side on the YESβNO AMM β receive (mintAmount + swapOut) of the target outcome. The 1:1 mint avoids the pure-swap "dust" of a thin pool. Proof verified against CID_MINT_SWAP (mint_swap.circom).
payloads carries two encrypted note payloads β [0] for the output
note, [1] for the COL change β in the same order the commitments are
inserted into the tree.
fn mint_swap(
env: soroban_sdk::Env,
relayer: soroban_sdk::Address,
proof: VProof,
public_inputs: soroban_sdk::Vec>,
payloads: soroban_sdk::Vec,
) fn get_config(env: soroban_sdk::Env) -> Configfn reserve_of(env: soroban_sdk::Env, asset: u32) -> i128Private SELL: swap part of the position to the other side, merge the matched pair 1:1 β COL (minus fee). Proof verified against CID_SWAP_MERGE (swap_merge.circom).
payloads carries two encrypted note payloads β [0] for the COL output
note, [1] for the leftover outcome change β in insertion order.
fn swap_merge(
env: soroban_sdk::Env,
relayer: soroban_sdk::Address,
proof: VProof,
public_inputs: soroban_sdk::Vec>,
payloads: soroban_sdk::Vec,
) fn remove_deny(env: soroban_sdk::Env, screening_ref: soroban_sdk::BytesN<32>)Settle a batch of trades as ONE aggregate reserve delta, so per-trade size and direction are not derivable from chain data.
v2 (2026-08-30) closes the last per-trade channel: the v1 circuits
published inputTotal/fee per intent and outAsset per leg, and those
publics ride in THIS call's argument vectors β so every leg's size and
direction sat in the transaction envelope even though the event and the
reserves hid them. The v2 vectors carry commitments, nullifiers, the root
and the price alone; the fee arrives once as the aggregate's proven
batchFee ([10]).
THREE PROOFS PER BATCH-PLUS-TWO-PER-LEG, and each is load-bearing:
intent (per leg) β the notes exist, are unspent, and are bound to a hidden trade. Intents never reach the chain, so without this the contract would be trusting the batcher that the inputs are real. leg (per leg) β the output note matches the batch's clearing price. aggregate (once) β the published net flow really is the sum of the committed amounts. The contract CANNOT deriv
fn batch_settle(
env: soroban_sdk::Env,
relayer: soroban_sdk::Address,
legs: soroban_sdk::Vec,
agg_proof: VProof,
agg_inputs: soroban_sdk::Vec>,
clearing_price: i128,
payloads: soroban_sdk::Vec,
) -> u32 fn private_swap(
env: soroban_sdk::Env,
relayer: soroban_sdk::Address,
proof: VProof,
public_inputs: soroban_sdk::Vec>,
) fn is_known_root(env: soroban_sdk::Env, root: soroban_sdk::BytesN<32>) -> boolfn withdraw_fees(env: soroban_sdk::Env, to: soroban_sdk::Address)